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 THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF
 MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION *
 Hyojoung Kim Peter S. Bearman
 The University of North Carolina The University of North Carolina
 at Chapel Hill at Chapel Hill
 We develop a dynamic network model of collective action that explains how
 collective action can arise in the absence of selective incentives or disincen-
 tives from the voluntary action of rational actors in large groups. We show
 that the search for balance in social interaction among interdependent ac-
 tors can yield a cascade of activism and result in a successful social move-
 ment. The characteristics of actors critical for movement success are identi-
 fied. We also explore the structural conditions underlying a successful cas-
 cade of activism and thus identify the social dynamics of and the structural
 conditions for collective action in human society.
 X V develop and test a dynamic model
 that accounts for voluntary collective
 action across a range of contexts. These di-
 verse contexts enable us to identify the so-
 cial dynamics of and the structural condi-
 tions for collective action in human society.
 Our model yields results that sharply chal-
 lenge arguments that rational actors will not
 contribute to the provision of a collective
 good, preferring instead to free-ride on the
 efforts of others. By extension, our results
 challenge Olson's (1965) argument that col-
 lective goods are produced only as a by-
 product of actors' pursuits of other goods,
 notably selective incentives or disincentives.
 Our results fit empirical observations of
 social movements: Specifically, even when
 their own contributions do not appear to
 count, when costs appear to exceed benefits,
 when risks come to outweigh rewards, and
 when success cannot be realized unless many
 people pool their resources and act in concert,
 rational individuals will participate in social
 movements that provide collective goods.
 They do so without constraint and without
 concern for the selective incentives or disin-
 centives that may accrue to them by virtue of
 their participation. We show how and when
 such actions yield movement success.
 PREVIOUS MODELS
 Because empirical observations of voluntary
 participation in collective actions defy
 Olson's prediction, other scholars have pro-
 posed alternatives to Olson's general model.
 These alternatives focus on the interdepen-
 dence of individual actors. Noting that
 Olson's predictions assume that actors be-
 have as if they were social isolates, others
 argue that models that recognize interdepen-
 dence among individuals may resolve
 Olson's collective action problem (Grano-
 vetter 1978; Fireman and Gamson 1979;
 Coleman 1990).
 Despite consensus on the importance of
 interdependent actors in explaining vol-
 untarism in collective action, none of the
 models proposed to date provides a meaning-
 ful theoretical alternative to Olson's argu-
 ment. In addition to the assumption that ra-
 tionality is central to individual action, a
 meaningful alternative must satisfy the fol-
 lowing conditions:
 (1) Actions must be seen as purposefully
 oriented toward the achievement of a
 * Direct correspondence to Hyojoung Kim and
 Peter Bearman, Department of Sociology, CB#
 3210 Hamilton Hall, University of North Caro-
 lina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599
 (hyojoung @gibbs.oit.edu; bearman @ gibbs.oit.
 unc.edu). We thank 'Franqois Nielsen for pro-
 gramming help, and acknowledge helpful com-
 ments from Craig Calhoun, Seokwoo Kim, and
 members of the Social Action and Social Struc-
 ture seminar at the University of North Carolina
 at Chapel Hill.
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 collective good-the collective good
 should not be a byproduct of other ac-
 tions.
 (2) There must be a large-group solution to
 the problem-models must apply to situ-
 ations "in which no single individual's
 contribution makes a perceptible differ-
 ence to the group as a whole" (Olson
 1965:44).
 (3) Models must offer practical solutions
 that do not rely on implausible assump-
 tions about human behavior, social
 structure, or socioeconomic conditions.
 In many models (Granovetter 1978; Oliver,
 Marwell, and Teixeira 1985; Marwell, Oliver,
 and Prahl 1988; Oliver and Marwell 1988;
 Macy 1990, 1991a), individuals are seen as
 interdependent in that they "take account of
 how much others have already contributed in
 making their own decisions about contribut-
 ing to a collective action" (Oliver et al.
 1985:504). By this definition, one actor's
 contribution or commitment to contribute
 tends to make others' subsequent contribu-
 tions increasingly effective, thus triggering
 others' participation. Here the presence of a
 critical mass willing to shoulder a large por-
 tion-and sometimes most-of the total cost
 when no one else is willing or ready to join is
 necessary for successful collective action
 (hence, critical mass theory).
 Although critical mass theory (Oliver et al.
 1985; Marwell et al. 1988; Oliver and Mar-
 well 1988) meets the first condition, showing
 "that the primary motive for collective action
 is the shared interest in the public good that
 is the explicit objective of the group" (Macy
 199 1a:730), it falls short of a large-group so-
 lution and relies on implausible socioeco-
 nomic assumptions. First, a collective good
 cannot be said to be jointly (aside from nomi-
 nally) produced if only a few actors (i.e., a
 critical mass) shoulder most of the total cost
 while others contribute almost nothing. As
 resources become more heterogeneously dis-
 tributed-a favorable condition for collective
 action according to Oliver and Marwell-
 fewer actors end up shouldering large propor-
 tions of the cost. Consequently, the "exploi-
 tation of the great by the small" becomes a
 central theme of critical mass theory-where
 those with great resources are exploited by
 those with few resources (a phenomenon
 unique to small groups). Collective goods are
 produced by a process that is only nominally
 collective.
 Second, critical mass theory lacks practi-
 cality because it relies too heavily on an ex-
 tremely unequal distribution of resources.
 Among members of the same beneficiary
 group (e.g., workers in labor movements,
 Blacks in the civil rights movement, indig-
 enous peoples in independence movements),
 economic resources tend to be distributed
 homogeneously rather than heterogeneously.
 Noneconomic resources like time, which
 tend to be critical in collective action, are
 impossible for a few persons to monopolize.
 Movements emerge in contexts that are not
 characterized by extreme heterogeneity, and
 models of collective action need to account
 for this empirical reality.
 Other models define interdependence dif-
 ferently. For Heckathorn (1992, 1993) and
 Gould (1993), individuals are interdependent
 in so far as they can limit others' choices
 through interpersonal influence. In this fam-
 ily of models, one actor's decision to partici-
 pate (Gould 1993) or to exert influence
 (Heckathorn 1993) delimits the opportunity
 for others to defect, constraining them to join
 in the collective action regardless of their
 preferences. In these models, the key to suc-
 cessful collective action is whether "the
 regulatory interests that mandate cooperation
 overcome inclinations that encourage defec-
 tion" (Heckathorn 1993:33 1).
 The major problem with these models is
 that they are grounded on actions that are not
 purposefully oriented toward the achieve-
 ment of a collective good-actors decide to
 contribute to a collective good, not out of
 their interests in the good, but out of their
 concern about possible social ostracism that
 might stem from defection. Interest in a col-
 lective good becomes irrelevant to the ma-
 jority of a population particularly those
 who are forced to participate, making the
 production of a collective good "a byproduct
 of the pursuit of an altogether different (and
 private) object" (Macy 1991a:730). Equally
 roblematic, the interpersonal influence pro-
 I This trend is most clearly evidenced by Gould
 (1993), who dropped the "interest" variable from
 his model.
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 cess underlying these models rests on the
 premise of the sanctioning role of norms.
 Sanctioning norms are simply a type of se-
 lective incentive or disincentive (Opp 1986).
 Norm-based explanations of collective ac-
 tion, including these interpersonal influence
 models, are a subtle reformulation of Olson's
 selective incentive model. They share the ba-
 sic conviction that collective action cannot
 arise out of voluntarism alone
 Given the limitations of prior interdepen-
 dence-based models, Olson (1993) was per-
 haps not exaggerating to argue-almost three
 decades after publishing his The Logic of
 Collective Action (1965)-that "the great
 preponderance of this literature agrees
 that . . . very large groups are not able to
 achieve collective goals through voluntary
 collective action" (p. 568). We agree that in-
 terdependence is fundamental; we build on
 earlier contributions to produce a general
 model of collective action that meets the
 three conditions identified above, thus pro-
 viding a meaningful alternative to Olson's
 (1965) argument and enabling us to identify
 the structural conditions that facilitate or
 block successful social movement activity.
 We show that large groups can achieve col-
 lective goods through voluntary action in the
 absence of incentives or disincentives.
 HISTORICICIZING INTERESTS:
 A DYNAMIC NETWORK MODEL OF
 COLLECTIVE ACTION
 The failure of prior rational-choice models
 stems from their implicit assumption that in-
 terests are fixed and that perceptions change.
 Thus, in critical mass theory, an ego's en-
 counter with others facilitates only the ex-
 change of information. In previous interper-
 sonal-influence models, human interaction
 shapes actors' perceptions of opportunities
 for defection. In neither model, however, are
 actors or their interests shaped by their inter-
 actions with others.2 Rather, interests are ex-
 ternally given and unchanging once given.
 This assumption of fixed interests misses the
 central dynamics of collective action-the
 "consciousness-raising," "micromobilizing,"
 or consensus-mobilizing efforts of move-
 ment activists who strive to transform the
 value systems of bystanders and their own
 colleagues (McAdam 1982, 1986; Klander-
 mans 1984; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and
 Benford 1986). As a consequence, other ra-
 tional-choice solutions to Olson's problem
 cannot help but depict collective action as
 "elitist" (critical mass models), "opportunis-
 tic" or "involuntary" (influence models), or
 simply "cold-minded business" (selective in-
 centive models).
 Moving beyond this static image of social
 movement dynamics, we relax the assump-
 tion of fixed interests to capture collective
 action in its historical context. We view hu-
 man interaction as the furnace of collective
 action in which ordinary men and women
 become activists. In our model, interactions
 shape interests. Interests are sensitive, not
 insensitive, to history. The difficulty lies in
 identifying an independent foundation for
 fluid interests from within rational choice.
 We argue that identity provides this founda-
 tion, and consequently our model allows
 both interests and perceptions to be sculpted
 by prior action sequences. Thus, our model
 responds to Tilly's (1978) call for explana-
 tions for "how a contender's collective ac-
 tion at one point in time changes the condi-
 tions which are relevant to the next round of
 action" (p. 229).
 Shaping interests is a delicate process, and
 we show that the social structure of collective
 action is fundamental to this process. Only a
 limited number of social structures can sus-
 tain a dynamic process that yields new or in-
 creased interests. The central feature of these
 structures is that they enable the coupling of
 interest and identity. Yet process is much
 more fragile than is structure. The key ele-
 ment is that actors recognize action dynam-
 ics when they occur: They must see iterations
 as iterations, for it is only through action dy-
 namics that actors will, in real life and in our
 model, come to see themselves as activists.
 2 A notable exception is Macy's (1990, 1991a)
 learning model, which requires a consistent rein-
 forcement schedule. However, such a schedule is
 difficult to establish without a control system, and
 "in the absence of a consistent reinforcement
 schedule, people will not behave in a predictable
 fashion" (Hechter 1987:65). Perhaps more prob-
 lematic, actors in Macy's model reflexively react
 to the persistence of social "bads." This assumes
 that the intersubjective process of meaning con-
 struction is unproblematic, an assumption that
 seems rather implausible.
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 Yet what seems unproblematic in modeling-
 an iteration-is absolutely fundamental to
 collective life.
 Our model is based on two obvious socio-
 logical propositions: (I) Actors are interde-
 pendent, and (2) activism is enhanced
 through increasing embeddedness in an ac-
 tivist network. The micro-dynamics of col-
 lective action captured by these two proposi-
 tions are realized in a tangible context in
 which some actors are more influential than
 others and in an action sequence in which
 past, even failed, action begets new condi-
 tions for future action.
 Actors Are Interdependent
 First, we assume that actors tend to base their
 decisions about participation upon others'
 decisions (Granovetter 1978; Oliver et al.
 1985; Marwell et al. 1988; Oliver and
 Marwell 1988). It follows that one's partici-
 pation tends to encourage others' participa-
 tion by making collective action more likely
 to succeed. Therefore one's defection tends
 to discourage others' participation by making
 collective action less likely to succeed.
 In real life, this interdependent decision-
 making process is conditioned by access to
 information as well as by access to power and
 other factors. Our model incorporates these
 conditions. Because information on others'
 decisions, interests, and resources are not al-
 ways accurate or readily available (Macy
 1990, 1991a), we recognize that social net-
 works structure the availability of accurate
 information on others' commitments. In our
 model, individuals have accurate information
 only on actors to whom they are directly tied.
 Thus, the assumption of forward-looking be-
 havior of rational actors that Macy (1990,
 1991a) criticized as too stringent becomes
 practical, although looking forward is
 bounded by an actor's own network.
 We also model the effect of power or so-
 cial leverage. Actors, while subject to others'
 influence, also try to gauge their own ability
 to shape others' decisions. Hence, ego's po-
 tential effect on alter's decisions has impli-
 cations for ego's own decision-making. The
 extent to which ego's contribution could in-
 duce alters to contribute to the provision of a
 collective good is essentially a function of
 ego's social leverage over alters. This for-
 ward-looking behavior is likewise bounded
 by ego's network.
 Oliver et al. (1985) argue that ordered de-
 cision-making (from the most to the least in-
 terested in an accelerative production func-
 tion) is a necessary condition for an interde-
 pendent decision-making process to yield
 successful collective action. But real con-
 texts are never so neat. The bounded nature
 of forward-looking behavior makes perfect
 orderliness implausible in real life. Yet the
 possibility of forward-looking behavior,
 however bounded, makes perfect random-
 ness unlikely as well. We assume that actors
 who are more interested tend to initiate col-
 lective action before less interested actors
 do, but that they need not do so.
 As with the interpersonal-influence mod-
 els, we also view actors as interdependent in
 that actors try to influence their neighbors
 (Gould 1993; Heckathorn 1993). We believe
 that interpersonal influence is one of the two
 processes underlying the dynamics of collec-
 tive action. In Gould's and Heckathorn's
 models, interpersonal influence is invoked to
 "regulate" other's inclinations to pursue their
 individual rationality or to "coerce" contri-
 butions out of reluctant or resistant bystand-
 ers. Consequently, actors confront restricted
 opportunities for defection, ultimately losing
 the freedom to pursue their own agenda.
 In contrast, we assume that actors seek bal-
 ance in their social relations and thus exer-
 cise interpersonal influence in order to induce
 homophily with regard to the pursuit of a
 collective good (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954;
 Kandel 1978). Interactions between activists
 and bystanders and among like-minded ac-
 tivists open up precious opportunities for
 what Snow et al. (1986) call "frame align-
 ment," a process through which people's atti-
 tudes, values, and behaviors become increas-
 ingly similar to those of other actors to whom
 they are tied.
 An interpersonal influence process based
 on homophily carries implications for the
 model. First, influence operates indepen-
 dently of one's cooperation status so that it
 is no longer selective. Second, influence nei-
 ther rewards nor punishes and thus does not
 involve selective incentives or disincentives.
 Finally, the direct outcome of influence is
 not that alter matches ego's level of coopera-
 tion, but rather that their attitudes and values
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 become more similar. Hence, influence cen-
 ters on each actor's level of interest in the
 provision of a collective good, not the deci-
 sion to contribute. In our model, whether to
 contribute is ultimately an actor's free and
 rational choice. In this context, the decision
 to participate is consistently voluntary and
 purposive with regard to the collective good.
 Asymmetries in interests across tied actors
 provide a basis for interpersonal influence.
 Thus, if actor A has higher interest than ac-
 tor B, actor A exercises upward influence on
 actor B (upward because A's influence en-
 hances B's interest). At the same time, actor
 B is exercising downward influence on actor
 A (downward because B's influence de-
 creases A's interest). Outcomes of the influ-
 ence process are conditioned by the actors'
 relative power in the network.
 We assume that actors are consistent and
 that they exercise influence as constrained by
 their prior participation in the following
 ways:
 (1) Actor A's nonparticipation deprives A of
 moral justification for exerting upward
 influence on actor B (Gould 1993), even
 if A has higher interest than B.
 (2) Actor A, who chooses to participate, will
 not exert downward influence that may
 frustrate actor B's participation, even if
 A's interest is lower than B's.
 This consistency rule, superimposed on the
 rule of asymmetries in interest, establishes
 conditions for influence, as summarized in
 Table 1. Influence is bidirectional, but not all
 interactions involve efforts to influence oth-
 ers. Nonparticipants are not necessarily hos-
 tile to the efforts of others, and in fact they
 may be thrilled that their neighbors are try-
 ing to provide them with a collective good.
 Thus, they have no incentive to proactively
 dissuade participants from contributing their
 resources to a movement. They are also in-
 different to the behavior of other nonpartici-
 pants. Only the presence of upward influence
 triggers downward influence. Nonpartici-
 pants only exercise downward influence re-
 actively, when they are exposed to the up-
 ward influence of their neighbors.
 The dynamics of collective action are
 shaped in large measure by the fact that par-
 ticipants need to reach out to others to in-
 Table 1. Effect of Participation and Assymetries
 of Interest on Interpersonal Influence
 A's Interest A's Interest
 Actor A Greater Than B's Less Than B's
 Participates Upward No influence
 influence
 Defects No influence Downward
 influence
 crease their numbers. By doing so, partici-
 pants risk exposure to downward influence.
 Accordingly, any movement expands at some
 risk, for contact with nonparticipants exposes
 participants to potential downward influence.
 This process is similar to that underlying the
 cascade model developed by Boorman and
 Levitt (1980), in which the heterodox (social
 animals) are at risk to orthodoxy by virtue of
 their contacts with the orthodox (asocial ani-
 mals). This model was generalized for ide-
 ational contexts by Bearman and Podolny
 (1987).
 Embeddedness Enhances Activism
 Because participation in a movement yields
 cognitive shifts that ex post account for par-
 ticipation, individuals often discover that
 they are movement activists after extensive
 involvement in activist networks. Increased
 embeddedness in activist networks yields a
 context for the deep ideational changes that
 are usually thought to yield participation in a
 movement (McAdam 1982, 1986; Bearman
 1993). It follows that an identity as an activ-
 ist and interest in a movement are produced
 within networks of interacting activists, and
 that contact with like-minded activists is the
 principal mechanism by which commitment
 is enhanced. Accordingly, the model devel-
 oped here assumes that once individuals par-
 ticipate in collective action, their interests
 are plastic. If they have contacts with other
 participants, individuals who join a move-
 ment can experience a dynamic increase in
 their level of interest. In this model, influ-
 ence operates on interests subsequent to in-
 dividual decisions about participation and
 creates a context in which densely knit
 groups of interacting participants fuel contin-
 ued participation across the many opportuni-
 ties (seen as iterations) that confront them.
This content downloaded from 209.2.208.15 on Fri, 22 Mar 2019 19:39:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION 75
 Influences Are Uneven
 Influence presumes contact. Networks struc-
 ture contact by determining the range of
 one's influence over others, by delimiting
 the degree or extent of influence that one
 can exert, and by determining the cost of in-
 fluence. Range refers to the number of per-
 sons ego can reach. The more actors ego is
 tied to, the more widely ego's influence may
 extend. The extent to which ego exercises
 influence over an alter is a function of their
 relative power in the network (Freeman
 1977, 1979; Bonacich 1987; Gould 1993).
 Here, we expand beyond dyadic power to
 consider how an individual's structural posi-
 tion shapes the outcomes of the influence
 process. Thus, ego's leverage over alters is
 conditioned by the alters' positions and the
 extent to which they are subject to counter-
 vailing influences. It follows that the cost of
 influence is a function of power relations in
 the network.
 There are several ways to conceptualize
 power in social networks. We focus on cen-
 trality, and use Bonacich's (1987) measure of
 centrality that explicitly defines ego's power
 as conditioned by the power of the alters to
 whom ego is tied. This measure captures the
 power of actors in terms of their control over
 the flow of information in an interpersonal
 communication network.
 Collective Action Occurs in the Context of
 Social Structure
 Actions cannot be decoupled from their so-
 cial settings; they are deeply rooted in social
 structures that can facilitate or block fresh
 action including collective action. Actions
 cannot be meaningfully modeled in the ab-
 sence of images of social structure. Hence,
 any explanation of voluntary collective ac-
 tion must identify the social structural bases
 for collective action. We define social struc-
 tures on the basis of how personal traits are
 distributed across populations and how ac-
 tors are connected with each other.
 First, following network-based approaches
 to social structure (White, Boorman, and
 Breiger 1976), we define social structure as
 a network of interpersonal ties. We pay par-
 ticular attention to the enabling or disabling
 role of the network density.
 Second, we also define social structures in
 terms of "the joint distribution [of a popula-
 tion among positions in a multidimensional
 space] whose main parameters are univariate
 variations and multivariate covariations"
 (Blau and Schwartz 1984:10). The multidi-
 mensional space of our dynamic social net-
 work model is described by three parameters:
 interests, resources, and power/centrality.
 Actors have certain levels of interest in a col-
 lective good and have discretionary re-
 sources that could be consumed toward the
 provision of the collective good; actors also
 occupy a position in a network of interper-
 sonal relations.
 What is often called group heterogeneity
 captures the unidimensional variations of
 these three parameters. We model interests,
 resources, and power/centrality as distributed
 according to chi-square distributions with
 varying degrees of freedom. Varying the de-
 grees of freedom (d.f.) enables us to vary the
 extent of heterogeneity. We test the effect of
 group heterogeneity when d.f. is set at 3, 7,
 and 20. Group heterogeneity is largest when
 d.f. equals 3 and smallest when d.f. equals
 20. The average of the interests and re-
 sources variables is constrained to be 1. A
 social network of personal ties is generated
 by partitioning a 100-member population
 into five groups of equal size. Roughly 30
 percent of all ties are sent across groups. In-
 terpersonal ties within each group and across
 groups are distributed following a chi-square
 distribution with varying degrees of freedom
 (equal to 3, 7, and 20).
 The multivariate covariations among these
 parameters (interests, resources, and power/
 centrality) have important implications for
 the model. Power, measured as centrality, is
 distinguished from other resources in that it
 enables the indirect production of a collec-
 tive good through the interpersonal influence
 process, although power cannot be consumed
 as a direct input for the provision of a good.
 Hence, we test how collective action is shap-
 ed under "collective action regimes" defined
 in terms of the relationships between power/
 centrality and interest and between power/
 centrality and resources. Regimes describe
 the social structure of the challenging group,
 not the structure in which the challenging
 group is embedded. Table 2 identifies the
 four collective action regimes of interest.
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 Table 2. Definition of Four Collective Action
 Regimes
 Correlation Correlation between Power!
 between Power/ Centrality and Interest
 Centrality and
 Resources Positive Negative
 Positive Privileged Impoverished
 regimes regimes
 Negative Rebellious Estranged
 regimes regimes
 When central actors (those with social
 power) control resources and have a high in-
 terest in the provision of collective goods
 relative to peripheral actors in the challeng-
 ing group, we find an elite or privileged re-
 gime. Consider the women's movement in
 the 1960s. Women who participated in the
 Commission on the Status of Women in 1961
 and later founded the National Organization
 of Women were mainly professionals (Free-
 man 1975). Compared to the women occu-
 pying more traditional female roles, profes-
 sional women stood to gain more from gen-
 der equality and thus had more interest in the
 movement. Professional women also had
 more economic and noneconomic resources
 at their disposal than did their traditional
 counterparts. Furthermore, their jobs as pro-
 fessionals allowed them to benefit from and
 manipulate far-reaching networks of inter-
 personal ties that their counterparts lacked.
 Here, interest, resources, and power/central-
 ity are all positively correlated.
 By contrast, an impoverished regime is one
 in which centrality and resources are posi-
 tively correlated, yet those with the greatest
 centrality and the most resources have little
 interest in the provision of collective goods.
 Those who have a high interest in a collec-
 tive good are pushed to the periphery and left
 without resources or social power. Organized
 insurgency is almost impossible in such a
 setting, for even if the heterodox actors on
 the periphery are mobilized into insurgency,
 their efforts are likely to be blocked by the
 orthodox elite whose interest in mobilization
 is low. In these settings, actors may resort to
 subtle forms of everyday resistance, what
 Scott (1985) has identified as weapons of the
 weak. Because these strategies are designed
 to be invisible, analysts and actors may not
 be aware of them. They may not be aware
 of, in our terminology, each iteration. The
 failure to recognize resistance further re-
 duces the possibilities for successful collec-
 tive action.
 In the estranged regime, centrality is nega-
 tively associated with both interest and re-
 sources. Actors who are highly interested in
 the provision of a collective good have re-
 sources, but they are estranged from other
 members and thus lack social leverage over
 their neighbors. In the ordinary course of
 events, they can exercise very little influ-
 ence. As with the impoverished regime, sus-
 tained movements are extremely unlikely. If
 a movement occurs, action is likely to be ex-
 plosive. Motivated, resourceful actors with-
 out any social leverage are drawn to highly
 symbolic and violent protests as the most ra-
 tional strategy for achieving influence.
 In rebellious regimes, central (powerful)
 actors have a high interest in collective
 goods and few resources. They have little to
 lose. This is the ideal-typical case for revo-
 lution, but the rebellious regime also fits
 cases in which central actors in communica-
 tion networks lead social movements (e.g.,
 the civil rights movement).
 THE FORMAL MODEL
 Our model has three components: production
 functions and individual payoffs, decision-
 making algorithms, and an interpersonal in-
 fluence process. The variables that enter into
 our formal model and the subsequent analy-
 ses are defined in Table 3.
 Production Functions and
 Individual Payoffs
 Following Macy (1990), the production
 function is modeled as a cumulative logistic
 function of the total contribution rate (irt):
 1 + exp(10[. 5 - IrT]) (1)
 where Y. is the production level at the tth it-
 eration (i.e., the probability of providing a
 public good or removing a public bad given
 7rT), and 7rt is the ratio of total contributions
 to total resources. This cumulative logistic
 function accelerates in its early phase, but
 decelerates in its later phase so that it simul-
 taneously deals with what Oliver et al.
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 Table 3. Definition of Variables Used in the Analysis
 Variable Definition
 Interest Level of interest in collective goods. Initially ranges between 0 and 5 with a
 mean of 1 and an upper limit of 100.
 Resource Discretionary and consumable resources (money, time, etc.) that actors con-
 tribute toward the production of collective goods. Ranges between 0 and 5
 with a mean of 1.
 Power/centrality The capacity of an actor to exert influence over others. Measured following
 Bonacich (1987).
 Rebellious regime (XI) Coded 1 if interests are positively correlated with power and resources are
 negatively correlated with power; 0 otherwise.
 Impoverished regime (X2) Coded 1 if interests are negatively correlated with power and resources are
 positively correlated with power; 0 otherwise.
 Estranged regime (X3) Coded 1 if interests and resources are negatively correlated with power; 0
 otherwise.
 Network density (X4) The extent to which actors are tied to each other. Ranges between 0 and 1.
 High density (X5) Coded 1 if X4 is greater than or equal to .50; 0 otherwise.
 Power heterogeneity (X6) Inequality in the distribution of power/centrality across actors. Coded 1 if
 distributed across actors most homogeneously with d.f. = 20; coded 2 if dis-
 tributed moderately heterogeneously with d.f. = 7; coded 3 if distributed most
 heterogeneously with d.f. = 3.
 Interest heterogeneity (X7) Inequality in the distribution of interest across actors. Coded following X6.
 Resource heterogeneity (X8) Inequality in the distribution of resources across actors. Coded following X6.
 (1985) identify as the "start-up" problem and
 the problem of "suboptimality."
 The share of collective goods going to ego
 i at the tth iteration, denoted Bti, is a function
 of both the total amount of collective goods
 provided and i's level of interest:
 B.' = YtRtotalIti. (2)
 The total volume of public goods provided is
 given by the production level Y. multiplied
 by total resources (Rtotai). Its value to each
 individual is obtained by weighting it by the
 level of interest in collective goods (Its) that
 ego has.
 Ego i's contribution at the tth iteration, de-
 noted Cti, is a function of ego i's own re-
 sources (Re) and ego i's decision to partici-
 pate (Vti):
 Cti = RVti,3)
 where Vt = 1 if ego i decides to participate at
 the tth iteration; otherwise VtI = 0.
 Accordingly, ego i's net benefit, denoted
 Sti, is ego i's share of a collective good, net
 of its cost:
 Stj -= Btj - Cti (4)
 Decision-Making Algorithms
 Following the rational-choice model, actors
 are "individualistically rational" in that each
 actor weighs action strategies and chooses
 the strategy the actor expects to produce the
 greatest personal benefit. In this simulation,
 actors face two action strategies: participa-
 tion or defection. Defection carries no cost
 and may lead to benefits derived from oth-
 ers' contributions. Others' contributions,
 which are considered at the moment of ego's
 decision, are the sum of the contributions
 made by ego's neighbors alone:
 I n
 7rti(Vte=?) =- R ERjVuTij, (if j), (5)
 Total j=i
 where Tij = 1 if i and j are directly tied; oth-
erwise Tij = 0.
 Participation carries some cost, but it may
 also yield more benefits than defection. The
 benefit derives from contributions made by
 ego's neighbors before ego's own decision
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 (equation 5), from ego's own contribution,
 and from the contributions likely to be made
 by ego's neighbors after they are exposed to
 ego's influence. The last two benefits come
 only with ego's participation. Because each
 actor tries to influence others to whom he or
 she is tied (Oberschall 1973; McAdam
 1986), each actor's decision to participate
 has subsequent implications for his or her
 neighbors whom he or she tries to influence.
 The level of contributions ego expects from
 his or her neighbors through the exercise of
 influence over them is a function of the
 neighbors' resources and ego's degree of in-
 fluence. Considering that each actor not only
 has his or her own power but is surrounded
 by powerful neighbors, we measure the de-
 gree of influence (Pij) ego i could exert over
 a neighbor j as the geometric mean of ego's
 power (Pi) relative to the neighbor's power
 (Pj) and to the power of the neighbors (Pk)
 of neighbor j:
 __P ri Pi r (i # j; i # k) . (6)
 P+P. n
 Hence, the total contribution level ego i ex-
 pects upon participation is:
 1 Jti(VY=O) + Ri
 27ti(V,j=1) = n (7)
 Rtotai PXijRj(l-VU)T11
 [ =1j
 where the last term in square brackets refers
 to the indirect production component of the
 total contribution by ego i. The 1 - Vtj ele-
 ment ensures that none of ego i's neighbors
 are double-counted. The Tij element (coded
 1 if i and j are directly tied; 0 otherwise)
 ensures that this forward-looking behavior is
 limited within i's ego network. Ego i's ex-
 pected net payoff upon defection,
 E{ Sti(vti=o) }, and upon cooperation,
 E{Sti(Vti=1,}, are obtained by substituting 7rT
 with equation 5 and 7, respectively, for
 equations 1, 2, and 4.
 Ego's final decision about whether to par-
 ticipate is a probabilistic function of ego's
 expected net payoff from contributing. For-
 mally, the probability for ego to participate,
 P{Vti=] }, is modeled as a cumulative logis-
 tic function of the expected marginal benefit
 (Mti) of ego's participation:
 I +exp(10[1 - Mtj) (8)
 where the expected marginal benefit (Mti) is
 obtained by
 Mt = E{Sti(I=)} - E{Sti(V=O) I(9)
 Ri
 where Ri stands for the cost of participation.
 Ego decides to participate when the probabil-
 ity of participation is greater than or equal to
 a random number; otherwise ego decides not
 to participate. Following Macy (1990,
 1991 a), decisions are probabilistic, not deter-
 ministic. Resources are assumed to be non-
 divisible (i.e., individuals contribute all or
 nothing of their discretionary resources).
 The Process of Interpersonal Influence
 The extent to which upward or downward in-
 fluence by an actor changes others' levels of
 interest is a function of the degree of asym-
 metry in their interests and the degree of in-
 fluence. Formally, increases in ego i's inter-
 est, UPI {I}, due to upward influence by
 neighbors j is given by
 fl
 UP{Itil} = -,(Itj It )PjiVtj (I - Vti)Tij
 j=1
 (i X ) (10)
 where Iti or Itj denotes ego i's or neighbor j's
 level of interest, Pj1 denotes j's degree of in-
 fluence over i, Vtj or Vj denotes ego i's or
 neighbor j's action choice, and Tij denotes
 whether ego i is tied to alter j (Tij = 1 if i
 andj are directly tied; 0 otherwise). As Table
 1 shows, upward influence operates only
 when i chooses to defect (Vt, = 0) and j
 chooses to participate (Vj = 1) and Ij is
 greater than Ii. And, only those who are di-
 rectly connected to ego i exert upward influ-
 ence (i.e., when Tij = 1). Similarly, the total
 decrease in ego i's interest, DOWN{I~I}, re-
 sulting from the downward influence by
 neighbors is given by:
 DOWN{ ti} = (Itj - iti)Pji(i - Vtj)VtiTij
 j=1
 (ij). (11)
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 This downward influence operates only when
 i chooses to participate (Vtj = 1), j chooses to
 defect (Vtj = 0), Ij is less than Ii, and i and j
 are directly connected (T11 = 1). Note that the
 difference term involving Iti and Ij in equa-
 tions 10 and 11 indicates that both i and j are
 moving toward the arithmetic mean point be-
 tween them.
 Finally, mutual reinforcement among ac-
 tivists is formally modeled as
 UP2{It}I=X - I'?j'
 j1 (12)
 (i j),
 where 1 +1 is a geometric balance point
 toward which both i and j are moving. This
 reinforcement process operates when both i
 and j choose to participate (Vtj = 1 and Vtj =
 1), independent of their relative levels of in-
 terest, and i and j are directly tied (Tij = 1).
 As noted, influence is costly. We make
 two assumptions for modeling the cost of
 influence. First, we assume that the average
 cost of influence is obtained by dividing the
 average resources available to an individual
 by the product of network density and the
 total population of the group. This ensures
 that the scope of interpersonal influence is
 not delimited by the total resources avail-
 able to the group or by network density.
 Second, we assume that the cost of influ-
 ence is sensitive to power relations. Hence,
 the cost to ego i to influence alter j is a
 function of alter ]'s centrality relative to ego
 i's centrality. In sum, the cost of influence,
 Kij, that ego i is expected to pay to influence
 neighbor] is given by:
 KU, N(fS )/ (13) ijN(Density) Pi (3
 Cost accrues only to upward influence be-
 cause downward influence is exercised reac-
 tively. Actors try to influence as many of
 their neighbors as possible. When an actor
 lacks sufficient resources to influence all of
 his or her neighbors, then that actor is as-
 sumed to be selective; that is, the actor
 chooses to invest his or her resources in
 those whose contributions could be biggest
 (cf. Marwell and Oliver 1993). Formally, ego
 i ranks neighbors in descending order by size
 of their expected contributions and invests
 his or her resources in his or her neighbors
 in that order until all of i's resources are con-
 sumed. Ego i obtains j's expected contribu-
 tion by multiplying j's resources by his or her
 power relative to j's power. Our model does
 not distinguish between contributions and
 the cost of influence. For actors in this
 model, the price of influence is considered a
 component of one's contribution.
 We present results from a computer simu-
 lation using the formal model described. The
 simulation starts with all actors preferring
 defection. Actors make sequential decisions
 on whether to participate in collective action.
 The sequence is determined by evenly mix-
 ing the rank of interests with a randomly
 generated rank. Each actor is allowed only
 one decision at each iteration. Interpersonal
 influence follows the decision-making pe-
 riod. Hence, the effect of influence is felt at
 each subsequent iteration, and no influence
 operates at the start. Interests, which are ex-
 posed to interpersonal influence, are allowed
 to change over iterations, and these changes
 create new conditions for the subsequent it-
 eration. However, actors' resources and cen-
 trality remain constant over time.
 Each simulation is composed of 200 itera-
 tions. Iterations represent collective action
 events-for example, a large-scale street
 demonstration, or alternatively what Scott
 (1985) calls "the weapons of the weak," such
 as footdragging or working-to-rule. Hence,
 many of the actors and even the target group
 may fail to notice that iterations are taking
 place. This is particularly true in the early
 phase of a movement. In fact, many itera-
 tions have probably taken place before
 people began to be aware of a meaningful
 collective action sequence.
 CASCADE OF ACTIVISM:
 THE DYNAMICS OF PARTICIPATION
 Figure la shows the course of contributions
 for the four collective action regimes. The
 key finding is that collective action fails in
 the impoverished and estranged regimes;
 successful collective action occurs only in
 the privileged and rebellious regimes. The
 successful movements tend to follow a simi-
 lar pattern. At the early or "pioneer" stage of
 a movement, the first 105 iterations in the
 privileged regime and the first 80 iterations
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 Figure 1. Total Contributions and Average Level of Interest, by Iteration: Four Collective Action
 Regimes
 Note: For these simulations, network density = .1, power heterogentity = 3 d.f., interest heterogeneity = 3
 d.f., and resource heterogeneity = 20 d.f. Total contributions are sum of contributions per iteration. Average
 level of interest is sum of interests across actors divided by 100 per iteration.
 in the rebellious regime, a handful of actors
 initiate collective action, only to repeatedly
 fail. This pioneer period is followed by the
 "start-up" period-the 106th to 120th itera-
 tion in the privileged regime and the 81st to
 95th iteration in the rebellious regime. The
 start-up period is characterized by a slight
 increase in the total volume of contributions
 that leads to an explosion of participation.
 Shortly thereafter, most of the population
 participate.3
 What drives these patterns of participa-
 tion? Figure lb shows changes in the aver-
 age level of interest for the four collective
 3Others report similar sudden outbursts of par-
 ticipation (Boorman and Levitt 1980; Bearman
 and Podolny 1987; Glance and Huberman 1994).
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 Figure 2. Average Level of Interest by Iteration for Three Groups: Privileged Regimes and Rebellious
 Regimes
 action regimes. Fundamental is the sudden
 surge in the average level of interests that
 occurs only in the privileged regimes and the
 rebellious regimes.
 Figures 2a and 2b show changes in the av-
 erage level of interest over iterations for
 three groups of actors in the privileged and
 rebellious regimes: the "critical mass" (those
 few individuals who consistently participate
 during the pioneer period), the "followers"
 (those who join the movement during the
 start-up period), and "latecomers" (those
 who participate late in the game).
 While in Figure la the total contributions
 fluctuate at low levels until around the 100th
 iteration in the privileged regime or the 80th
 iteration in the rebellious regime, Figures 2a
 and 2b reveal that two dynamic micro-level
 processes cause followers to become more
 radical and leaders to become more prag-
 matic. On the one hand, a few movement ac-
 tivists (the most interested of the critical
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 mass) consistently exercise upward influence
 on others. Exposed to the influence of these
 enthusiasts, actors in the "grassroots" slowly
 align with the committed activists and trans-
 form their ideological framework to corre-
 spond to that of the enthusiasts (Snow et al.
 1986). This process is reflected in the slow
 but steady increase in the average level of
 interest among followers and latecomers in
 both regimes.
 Simultaneously, some nonparticipants
 counter the upward influence of activists
 with their own downward influence. Conse-
 quently, the more contact activists have with
 defecting neighbors, the more pragmatic they
 become. This trend is shown by the decrease
 in the average level of interest among the
 most interested members of the critical mass
 in both regimes. In both the privileged re-
 gimes and rebellious regimes, the conscious-
 ness-raising activities of activists dominate
 the heartbreaking effects of defection, ulti-
 mately leading to a steady increase in the av-
 erage level of interest. In the impoverished
 and estranged regimes, by contrast, the op-
 posite occurs.
 At a critical moment, the average level of
 interest increases sharply, occasioned by
 new members joining the pool of activists.
 The resulting expansion of the initially
 small group of activists greatly enhances the
 opportunities for interaction among activ-
 ists, setting off a bandwagon effect of mu-
 tual reinforcement. Thus, despite numerous
 failed attempts at collective action, the ac-
 tivist view spreads across the population.
 This cascade of activism suggests a radical-
 ization of consciousness, that in turn is re-
 flected in increased contributions, thus mak-
 ing successful collective action possible.
 This model of collective action shows that
 an event at one point in time, whether suc-
 cessful or not, can create new possibilities
 for subsequent collective action. Any at-
 tempted collective action provides fodder for
 the micro-dynamics through which apathetic
 bystanders, exposed to the consciousness-
 raising activities of enthusiasts, become in-
 creasingly sympathetic to movement goals
 and ultimately identify themselves with the
 movement. The development of a collective
 identity among segments of the potential
 constituency is an important legacy of past
 activism to be mobilized for future actions, a
 process observed in many social movements,
 such as the labor movement (Sewell 1980;
 Golden 1988), peasant uprisings (Shin 1994),
 and the women's movement (Mueller 1987;
 Taylor 1989).
 Our dynamic network model also demon-
 strates the possibility of voluntary collective
 action without any "selective incentives."
 Neither economic incentives or disincentives
 were provided for either participants or non-
 participants, and actors were not forced to
 participate independent of their preferences:
 They participated voluntarily on the basis of
 rational calculation. Although they influ-
 enced each other, they exercised this influ-
 ence not to "force" their neighbors to partici-
 pate, but to reach balance. This process
 shows that collective action can occur from
 a voluntaristic basis; thus we reject Olson's
 conclusion that voluntary collective action is
 not possible in a large group.
 THE CRITICAL MASS:
 AGENTS OF CHANGE
 Oliver and Marwell (Oliver et al. 1985;
 Marwell et al. 1988; Oliver and Marwell
 1988; Marwell and Oliver 1993) show that a
 small group can create the conditions for
 subsequent collective action. Our model sup-
 ports this view, showing that during the "pio-
 neer" period when success is unlikely, only a
 few persons consistently commit to the
 cause. They trigger a cascade of activism that
 paves the way for mass participation in sub-
 sequent iterations. Clearly, the critical mass
 is important for successful collective action;
 but who are they?
 Oliver and Marwell argue that the critical
 mass is composed of persons interested
 enough to initiate action and resourceful
 enough for their contributions to make a dif-
 ference in the probability of success. Re-
 sources are a crucial prerequisite for the
 critical mass, whose members are drawn dis-
 proportionately from the elite. This image of
 the critical mass is appropriate for explain-
 ing late phases of a social movement when it
 is largely institutionalized and depends on a
 sustained inflow of various resources. How-
 ever, the image does not fit well with early
 phases of social movements, phases that are
 often characterized by "the excess of politi-
 cal energy among masses" (Piven and Clo-
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 Table 4. Differences between Means of Three Characteristics for Three Groups in a Social Move-
 ment: Privileged Regimes and Rebellious Regimes
 Group
 Characteristic Critical Mass Followers Latecomers
 Regimes Combined **
 Power/centrality 1.70 1.47 .80
 (.14) (.19) (.34)1
 Interest 2.281.88 |8** 3
 (1.17) ~~~~(.75) -(.65)
 Resources .86 .88 ** 1.02
 (.36) (.33)
 Number of cases 9 20 171
 Regimes Separated
 Resources in privileged regimes 1.14 1.11 .98
 (.14) (.35) (.32)
 Number of cases 5 9 86
 F-~~~~*
 Resources in rebellious regimes .68 1.06
 I (.14)1 1 (.15) (.29)
 Number of cases 4 11 85
 Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Differences between the means are determined
 by pairwise t-tests. Boxes and asterisks indicate significant differences.
 *p < .05 ** < .01 (two-tailed tests)
 ward 1979:xxi). Our results reveal that a
 critical mass is not necessarily drawn from
 the elite and its members are likely to par-
 ticipate well before institutionalization of the
 movement.
 Table 4 compares the levels of interest, re-
 sources, and power/centrality for the critical
 mass, followers, and latecomers across privi-
 leged regimes and rebellious regimes. Note
 that across both regimes the critical mass
 tends to have more power and greater inter-
 est than do members of the other two groups,
 although the difference between the critical
 mass and followers is not statistically signifi-
 cant. With respect to resources, the compari-
 son of means is misleading because the re-
 sources possessed by the critical mass are re-
 gime-specific: Members of the critical mass
 are likely to be rich in privileged regimes but
 poor in rebellious regimes. This suggests that
 resources are not crucial for the critical mass.
 What the critical mass shares across both re-
 gimes is commitment and a central position
 in the social network. The critical mass must
 be interested enough to initiate action even
 when others are not willing to join. Members
 also must have sufficient social leverage so
 that their actions induce others to join.
 The fact that the critical mass can be poor,
 particularly in the rebellious regime, does
 not mean that its members contribute little
 and make others shoulder most of the costs.
 On the contrary, the critical mass makes im-
 portant contributions in terms of both vol-
 ume and timing. Table 5 compares the cumu-
 lative contributions made by the critical mass
 and the richest members of the beneficiary
 group during the pioneer and start-up peri-
 ods when the probability of success is small
 and during the subsequent insurgent period
 until all members participate.
 During the early periods in the privileged
 regime, the average contributions made by
 members of the critical mass far exceed
 those made by the richest actors. Later, when
 success is almost certain, the richest actors
 rush into the movement, contributing more
 than the critical mass. Yet even with these
 heavy contributions at the last minute, the
 critical mass's overall contribution remains
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 Table 5. Average Cumulative Contribution and Average Participation for the Critical Mass and the
 Richest Members: Privileged Regimes and Rebellious Regimes
 Privileged Regimes Rebellious Regimes
 Critical Richest Critical Richest
 Characteristic Mass Members Mass Members
 Average resources 1.14 1.75 .51 1.79
 Average cumulative contribution 52.7 45.9 41.0 9.1
 Pioneer and start-up periods 23.0 3.8 24.6 0.0
 Insurgent period 29.7 42.1 16.4 9.1
 Average participation .32 .18 .65 .04
 Pioneer and start-up periods .17 .02 .54 .00
 Insurgent period 1.00 .92 1.00 .48
 greater than that of the richest members. In
 the rebellious regime, contributions made by
 members of the critical mass are far more
 conspicuous, despite the fact that the critical
 mass includes many of the poorest members
 of the population. The critical mass consis-
 tently contributes much more than the rich-
 est members whatever the chances of suc-
 cess. In this rebellious regime, the richest ac-
 tors adopt an extremely opportunistic strat-
 egy - they join the movement only at the last
 minute. Although relatively poor, the critical
 mass makes large contributions over the long
 run. Olson (1965) and Oliver et al. (1985)
 suggest that the provision of collective goods
 (however suboptimal) results from the ex-
 ploitation of the great by the small. If only it
 were true. Our findings suggest that the small
 generally contribute more than the great, and
 that in rebellious regimes, the small are of-
 ten exploited by the great.
 The direct contributions made by the criti-
 cal mass are extremely important for move-
 ment success, in large part because their early
 contributions create a context for others to
 contribute. In contrast to predictions derived
 from critical mass theory, our model shows
 that the rich are both opportunistic and ster-
 ile: They contribute only when a lucrative
 return is guaranteed and their contributions
 beget no additional contributions. Consider-
 ing the opportunism of the richest actors in
 our model, their contributions are the last
 thing one would want to rely on. The same
 pattern seems to hold in everyday life.
 Neither interests, nor resources, nor power/
 centrality are sufficient to induce actors to
 assume the role of the critical mass. An
 analysis of the interpersonal ties among
 members of the critical mass and ties be-
 tween members of the critical mass and their
 followers provides further insight into the
 character of the critical mass. Figure 3 por-
 trays the social networks of members of the
 critical mass and their followers in privileged
 regimes and rebellious regimes.4
 A central finding is that the critical mass
 forms a densely interlocking clique, while
 most followers are only marginally tied to
 this densely knit network of activists. Recall
 that followers do not differ from the critical
 mass with respect to interests or resources.
 Clearly, the critical mass is not composed of
 isolated individuals, but is recruited intact
 from a small densely interlocked segment of
 the population. In the critical mass, interest
 and identity go hand in hand.
 This densely interlocking social network
 of activists plays a special role in the devel-
 4 We report only geodesic ties that lead to
 members of the critical mass.
 5 The importance of the interlocking social net-
 work for the critical mass is further evidenced by
 the presence of a pseudo-critical mass, comprised
 of those with personal characteristics similar to
 those in the critical mass but who fail to play a
 leading role. A comparison of the social networks
 of the pseudo-critical mass and the critical mass
 reveals that members of the pseudo-critical mass
 are either excluded from or only marginally
 linked to the central activist core. Figure 3 shows
 that in addition to high centrality and a firm com-
 mitment to the cause, actors must also be deeply
 embedded in a densely interlocking network of
 activists to assume the role of the critical mass.
This content downloaded from 209.2.208.15 on Fri, 22 Mar 2019 19:39:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION 85
 PRIVILEGED REGIMES REBELLIOUS REGIMES
 _ ___ 'i... **.@..
 O The critical mass Ties among members of the critical mass
 0 Followers directly tied to the critical mass Ties between the critical mass and the leading followers
 O Followers indirectly tied to the critical mass Ties between the critical mass and other followers and
 ties between followers
 Figure 3. The Social Network of the Critical Mass and Their Followers
 Note: Numbers refer to a ranking of each actor by resources.
 opment of collective consciousness and the
 cascade of activism. Densely interlocked net-
 work ties insulate the critical mass from
 counter-pressures exerted by defecting
 neighbors throughout the long early stages of
 a social movement. Without the capacity for
 mutual encouragement, members of the criti-
 cal mass risk apostasy in which leaders con-
 vert from activism to defection. As Axelrod
 (1984) argued,
 [T]he development [of cooperation] cannot
 take place if it is tried only by scattered indi-
 viduals who have no chance to interact with
 each other. But cooperation can emerge from
 small clusters of discriminating individuals, as
 long as these individuals have even a small
 proportion of their interactions with each other.
 (P. 68)
 Dense ties among members of the critical
 mass enhance commitment by making pos-
 sible stable encounters with other activists.
 With expansion of the activist network
 through recruitment of followers, the critical
 mass becomes increasingly surrounded by
 like-minded activists. This process yields
 heightened interest in the collective good,
 and accounts for the sudden surge of interest
 among both members of the critical mass and
 their followers.6
 These findings provide insight into the
 process of identity formation and its conse-
 quences. The development of collective
 identity and solidarity among activists does
 more than "provide the basis for actors to
 shape their expectations and calculate the
 costs and benefits of their action" (Melucci
 1989:34). Identity and solidarity also help
 activists to preserve, and even further en-
 hance, their initial commitment in the face
 of the cross-pressures exerted by defectors.
 Tight networks create an ideological enve-
 lope in which militancy is intensified and
 from which activism diffuses across the
 population. The diffusion of activism enables
 the subsequent expansion of identity, open-
 ing up new opportunities for further activ-
 ism. This symbiosis between identity and in-
 terest is the key to the success of any social
 movement.
 6 Coleman (1990) identifies an apparently simi-
 lar process. He argues that the enclosure of social
 networks can overcome free-rider activity
 through the creation of norms and sanctioning
 systems.
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 CAI = a, + /3X4 + f2X42(1-X5) + 03X6 + /4X7 + /5X8 + /6X5 + /7X5X4
 + P8X5X6 + P9X5X7 + 310(X5X8 +
 0(2X1 + PllXlX4 + P12X1X42(1-X5) + P13X1X6 + ,4XX7 + P15XIX8
 + f16X1X5 + /17XX5X4 + /18XX5X6 + P19XIX5x7 + P20XX5X8 +
 0x3X2 + P21 X2X4 + P22X2X42( 1-X5) + P23X2X6 + P24X2X7 + /25X2X8
 + P26X2X5 + P27X2X5X4 + P28X2X5X6 + P29X2X5X7 + P33x2X5X8 +
 Q4X3 + P33IX3X4 + P332X3X42(1-X5) + P33X3X6 + P34X3X7 + P35X3X8
 + P36X3X5 + P37X3X5X4 + P38X3X5x6 + P39X3X5X7 + P40X3X5X8. (14)
 THE STRUCTURE OF PARTICIPATION
 Collective Action Regimes and
 Collective Action
 Collective action cannot succeed unless the
 upward influence of the critical mass domi-
 nates the downward influence of their defect-
 ing neighbors. What structures-defined in
 terms of collective action regimes, network
 density, and group heterogeneity-facilitate
 upward influence and block downward influ-
 ence? To analyze the structural prerequisites
 for a cascade of activism, we ran 1,296 com-
 puter simulations across various structural
 conditions defined by the intersection of ac-
 tion regimes, network density, and the distri-
 butions of power/centrality, interest, and re-
 sources. The outcome of each simulation is
 summarized by a Collective Action Index
 (CAI). The index is the sum of total contri-
 butions made across 200 iterations of each
 simulation divided by 200 and ranges be-
 tween 0 and 100. The higher the CAI, the
 more likely collective action is to succeed.
 The CAI is regressed on collective action re-
 gimes, network density, and group heteroge-
 neities according to equation 14 (above).
 Table 6 reports OLS regression outcomes
 across all four action regimes and the aver-
 age CAI scores for each regime.
 We have already noted that collective ac-
 tion is most likely to succeed in the privi-
 leged regimes and the rebellious regimes and
 fail in the impoverished regimes and es-
 tranged regimes. Table 6 suggests that col-
 lective action can succeed even in impover-
 ished regimes and estranged regimes under
 certain conditions, as the average CAI is 26.0
 for privileged regimes, 56.4 for rebellious re-
 gimes, 11.0 for impoverished regimes, and
 5.6 for estranged regimes. However, a care-
 ful look at Table 6 reveals that in the impov-
 erished regimes and the estranged regimes,
 collective action succeeds only when net-
 work density is high (i.e., above .49). In fact,
 all coefficients are insignificant when net-
 work density is below .49. Because network
 density above .49 is unlikely in a large
 group, collective action will fail in impover-
 ished regimes and estranged regimes?7
 The characteristic that distinguishes the
 privileged regimes and rebellious regimes
 from the estranged regimes and impover-
 ished regimes is whether those who occupy
 central positions in the social network have
 an interest in the provision of a collective
 good, thus initiating collective action. In the
 privileged regimes and the rebellious re-
 gimes, those most interested in the provision
 of a collective good are socially influential
 individuals; whereas in the impoverished re-
 gimes and the estranged regimes, influential
 individuals are either uninterested or actively
 hostile to the movement. For a social move-
 ment to be successful, some socially influen-
 tial actors must be committed to the cause
 and must initiate action. A sudden surge of
 interest in a collective good is unlikely to oc-
 cur among ordinary people when powerful
 actors oppose it. Note that in this context the
 initiatives of preexisting leaders in overcom-
 ing the efficacy problem by maximizing their
 social leverage over individual contributions
 turns out to be central to the success of col-
 lective action (Oberschall 1973)8
 7 There may be contexts in which a large group
 could experience the sense of heightened connec-
 tions required to yield successful collective ac-
 tion, for example, the kinds of processes de-
 scribed by Anderson (1983) as imagined commu-
 nities.
 8 Although Oberschall (1973) places more em-
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 Table 6. OLS Coefficients from the Regression of the Collective Action Index (CAI) on Selected In-
 dependent Variables: Four Collective Action Regimes
 Regimes
 Privileged Rebellious Impoverished Estranged
 Independent Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
 Network Density < .49
 Intercept -30.28** (4.79) -70.63** (4.79) .01 (4.79) -.16 (4.79)
 Network density 24.14** (28.56) 297.71* (28.56) -.31 (28.56) -.84 (28.56)
 (Network density)2 140.55** (67.05) -248.26** (67.05) 1.27 (67.05) 4.10 (67.05)
 Power/centrality 7.44** (1.21) 9.73** (1.21) -.01 (1.21) .09 (1.21)
 heterogeneity
 Interest heterogeneity 12.08** (1.21) 19.28** (1.21) .01 (1.21) -.09 (1.21)
 Resource heterogeneity -4.91** (1.21) 2.86* (1.21) .00 (1.21) .10 (1.21)
 Average CAI 9.77 33.44 .02 .08
 Network Density > .49
 Intercept -47.51** (7.69) 63.32** (7.69) -91.20** (7.69) -57.44** (7.69)
 Network density 36.33** (8.26) 19.23** (8.26) 113.16** (8.26) 71.08** (8.26)
 Power/centrality 9.93** (1.79) 1.10 (1.79) -8.59** (1.79) 1.38 (1.79)
 heterogeneity
 Interest heterogeneity 37.99** (1.79) 4.69** (1.79) 26.66** (1.79) 3.42 (1.79)
 Resource heterogeneity -12.50** (1.79) -.16 (1.79) 1.29 (1.79) 5.81 (1.79)
 Average CAI 48.69 88.50 26.48 13.37
 Average CAI for all densities 26.00 56.40 11.00 5.60
 Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; R2 = .86.
 <.05 **p < .01 (two-tailed tests)
 Table 6 also shows that collective action is
 far more robust and frequent in rebellious re-
 gimes (average CAI = 56.4) than in privi-
 leged regimes (average CAI = 26.0). This is
 a new finding. On one hand, our findings
 support Macy (1991 a), who showed that col-
 lective action occurs even when interests and
 resources are negatively correlated. On the
 other hand, contrary to Macy's prediction
 that collective action is more frequent when
 interests and resources are positively corre-
 lated, we show that the likelihood of a suc-
 cessful collective action is far higher in re-
 bellious regimes than in privileged regimes.
 The reason is counter-intuitive. In privileged
 regimes the potential critical mass is likely
 to be overloaded with resources. Thus, the
 negative coefficient for resource heterogene-
 ity in the privileged regimes complements
 our earlier findings about the identity of the
 critical mass. Although resources are not cru-
 cial to the critical mass, an excess of re-
 sources makes participation too costly for
 one to take the initiative.
 These findings modify claims advanced by
 Oliver and Marwell. Based on the notion that
 the critical mass comprises persons who are
 highly interested and resourceful, Marwell
 and Oliver (1993) argue:
 [A] positive correlation between interest and
 resources (or among other factors) is always
 beneficial for collective action. .. By contrast,
 a negative correlation between interest and re-
 sources is extremely unfavorable for collective
 action. (P. 23; italics added)
 phasis on "formal" leadership based on preexist-
 ing organizations, we highlight the role of "infor-
 mal" leadership based on the networks of inter-
 personal ties. However, this subtle distinction be-
 comes less important because formal organiza-
 tions often provide "foci" around which individu-
 als organize their social relations (Feld 1981).
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 Our model, however, shows that a positive
 correlation between interests and resources
 sometimes increases the chance of success-
 ful collective action (as is the case in privi-
 leged regimes), but just as often this positive
 correlation has a negative effect (as is the
 case in estranged regimes). Likewise, suc-
 cessful collective action occurs when inter-
 ests and resources are negatively correlated,
 as is the case for the rebellious regime. What
 ultimately determines the success of collec-
 tive action is the pattern of covariance be-
 tween power/centrality and interests, not be-
 tween resources and interests.
 Network Density and Collective Action
 Conventionally, dense social networks are
 believed to facilitate collective action (Ober-
 schall 1973; Tilly 1978; Fireman and Gam-
 son 1979). Social networks have been shown
 to be responsible for differential recruitment
 (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980), for
 participation in the Mississippi Freedom
 Summer project (McAdam 1986), and for
 participation in the Paris Commune of 1871
 (Gould 1990). Despite these findings, most
 formal models of the effect of network den-
 sity on collective action show mixed out-
 comes. For example, Marwell et al. (1988)
 and Marwell and Oliver (1993) find that in-
 creasing social network density extends the
 reach of an organizer, which in turn produces
 greater total contributions. Yet Macy (199 lb)
 finds the opposite effect, showing that a
 dense network tends to inhibit collective ac-
 tion because it decreases one's ability to dis-
 criminate between defectors and cooperators.
 For Gould (1993), the effect of network den-
 sity is more complex. In Gould's model, net-
 work density facilitates collective action
 when the least central actor initiates action.
 When the most central actor initiates action,
 however, network density evidences an in-
 verted U-shaped relationship with action.
 Gould shows that above a low threshold (.1),
 network density is deleterious to collective
 action because heightened density strength-
 ens the impact of cross-pressures from pe-
 ripheral actors.
 Against this background, we find that
 dense social networks always facilitate col-
 lective action. When network density is less
 than or equal to .49, the effect of network
 density shows a curvilinear pattern (U-
 shaped in the privileged regimes but inverted
 U-shaped in the rebellious regimes). How-
 ever, this positive effect of network density
 levels off sharply as network density goes
 above .50, which is reflected by the much
 smaller but still positive coefficients in the
 privileged regimes and the rebellious re-
 gimes.9 Increasing network density beyond
 an unlikely level makes collective action pos-
 sible even in the impoverished regimes and
 the estranged regimes.
 These findings reveal three patterns in the
 effect of network density. First, when net-
 work density is close to 0 (e.g., .01 or .05)
 and individuals are essentially social isolates,
 contributions result only from individual con-
 siderations and interpersonal influence does
 not operate. In the absence of social ties, col-
 lective action does not succeed (Kim 1995).
 On the other hand, when network density ap-
 proaches saturation (i.e., density above .5),
 the "local" boundary of rationality becomes
 globalized and no transaction costs accrue to
 interpersonal interactions, including informa-
 tion exchange. In saturated social networks,
 contributions result from greatly enhanced
 "group efficacy," and successful collective
 action is the norm, not the exception. Both
 contexts constitute the two forms of struc-
 tureless social networks, or what White et al.
 (1976) describe as the null structures.
 The real world is structured, and therefore
 network densities usually range between
 these two extremes. Within a realistic range
 of network density (between .05 and .49), the
 effect of network density is positive and sig-
 nificant only in the privileged regimes and
 the rebellious regimes. The coefficients for
 network density are greatest in these two re-
 gimes, suggesting that increasing interper-
 sonal interactions is the most decisive factor
 determining the success of collective action.
 The positive effect for network density is
 much larger in the rebellious regimes than it
 is in the privileged regimes. In rebellious re-
 gimes under which central actors have little
 9 The effect of network density here resembles
 Gould's (1993) when random actors initiate con-
 tributions. However, this does not mean that our
 finding supports Gould's. In our model, central
 actors initiate collective action. Gould argues that
 the effect of network density is negative when
 central actors take the initiative.
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 to lose, increasing network density becomes
 the single most important structural condi-
 tion for successful collective action.
 These findings support what we know
 should be true from empirical observation:
 Although bounded by types of collective ac-
 tion regimes, network density is positively
 associated with collective action. Network
 density enhances collective action because
 with increasing density, individuals are
 brought into communication with one an-
 other. Consequently they share information,
 develop more similar world views, and de-
 velop the relational bases for shared identity.
 As density increases, local worlds are elided,
 and individuals are freed from the cross-
 pressures characteristic of localist social
 structures.
 Group Heterogeneity and Collective Action
 There are two competing arguments regard-
 ing the effect of group heterogeneity on col-
 lective action. One argument finds that het-
 erogeneity in interests and resources facili-
 tates collective action by helping a critical
 mass form (Olson 1965; Hardin 1982; Oliver
 et al. 1985; Marwell et al. 1988; Oliver and
 Marwell 1988). Another argument maintains
 that under certain circumstances, group het-
 erogeneity can impede collective action
 through subcleavage formation (Heckathorn
 1992, 1993). We find a complex relationship
 between group heterogeneity and collective
 action, depending on the collective action re-
 gime and the degree of network density.
 Table 6 shows how the effect of group het-
 erogeneity depends on the four action re-
 gimes and network density. In the privileged
 regimes and the rebellious regimes, when net-
 work density remains within a plausible
 range (i.e., below .5), increasingly heteroge-
 neous distributions of centrality and interests
 enhance the probability of successful collec-
 tive action. On the other hand, resource het-
 erogeneity has mixed effects on collective
 action because it plays a complex role in
 group formation, particularly in the formation
 of the critical mass. Members of the critical
 mass have high centrality and high interest in
 the provision of a collective good. The more
 heterogeneously distributed are power and
 interests in privileged regimes and rebellious
 regimes (in which power and interests are
 positively correlated), the more committed to
 the cause and influential the critical mass be-
 comes. Consequently, the critical mass be-
 comes motivated to initiate collective action,
 their social leverage is enhanced, and collec-
 tive action is more likely to succeed. The ap-
 parently contradictory impact of resource het-
 erogeneity-negative in privileged regimes
 and positive in rebellious regimes-points to
 our earlier conclusion that when the distribu-
 tion of resources overloads the potential criti-
 cal mass, collective action will fail. In privi-
 leged regimes, low resource heterogeneity
 ensures that the critical mass is not burdened
 by too many resources. In rebellious regimes
 in which resources are negatively correlated
 with centrality and interest, increasing re-
 source heterogeneity tends to free the critical
 mass from the burden of possessing too many
 resources. 10
 In sum, group heterogeneity has no effect
 on the success of collective action when for-
 mation of a critical mass is structurally
 blocked, either because centrality and inter-
 ests are negatively correlated (as in the im-
 poverished regimes and the estranged re-
 gimes) or because of extremely low network
 density. Bounded by these conditions but
 within a plausible range of network density,
 the effect of group heterogeneity on collec-
 tive action is largely determined by how it
 helps the critical mass form.
 CONCLUSION
 A large literature is devoted to solutions of
 the Olson problem: Under what conditions
 10 Increasing network density increases beyond
 .49 changes the effect of group heterogeneity
 across regimes. In privileged regimes, high net-
 work density adds to the positive effect of inter-
 est heterogeneity and the negative effect of re-
 source heterogeneity, suggesting a symbiosis be-
 tween identity and interest. In rebellious regimes,
 however, high network density greatly reduces
 the positive effects of power and interest hetero-
 geneity. This suggests that an excess of group
 identity and solidarity makes personal attributes
 largely irrelevant. High network density in the
 other two regimes causes some of the group het-
 erogeneity variables to be significant. However,
 these effects of group heterogeneity in a context
 of extremely high network density are substan-
 tively meaningless, because heterogeneity and
 density are orthogonal in tangible settings.
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 will rational actors, in the absence of incen-
 tives or disincentives, contribute to the pro-
 vision of a collective good? Scholars have
 invariably assumed that interests are exter-
 nally given and fixed. The assumption that
 interests are fixed has locked theorists into
 depicting participation in a movement as a
 byproduct of opportunism or, at best, "non-
 outcome-oriented" behavior (Elster 1989).
 Against this tradition, we assume that inter-
 est is a social and historical construct that
 can be directly incorporated into a dynamic
 model of collective action. Our model social-
 izes and historicizes interests. Interests are
 seen to be shaped through a historical pro-
 cess of interpersonal influence, and the pro-
 cess of forming interests is seen to be a cen-
 tral element in determining the likelihood of
 successful collective action. Historicizing in-
 terests enables us to show that rational ac-
 tors will, under specific structural conditions,
 voluntarily participate in social movements
 in the absence of selective incentives or dis-
 incentives. Specifically, we identify a cas-
 cade of activism as a foundation for volun-
 tary collective action. This voluntaristic
 mechanism works only in privileged regimes
 and rebellious regimes in which central ac-
 tors who are committed to the cause initiate
 action. In other regimes, such cascades of
 activism are unlikely to occur.
 Our model provides new insights into the
 composition of the critical mass, the role of
 network density in shaping collective action,
 the historical problem of recognizing action
 sequences, and ultimately, the possibilities
 for successful collective action in highly re-
 pressive regimes.
 Our model confirms the crucial role played
 by a small group of highly active individuals
 in making successful collective action pos-
 sible. In all models, the critical mass is com-
 posed of persons who are most interested in
 collective action. In contrast to previous
 work, however, we show that the critical
 mass need not command a disproportionate
 share of a group's resources. Centrality-the
 capacity to exert leverage over others in the
 challenging group-is more important than
 resources. But centrality is only a necessary
 condition for the emergence of a critical
 mass. Fundamental is the organization of
 motivated actors into a densely linked activ-
 ist core that is insulated from counter-pres-
 sures encouraging defection-what we iden-
 tify as an ideological envelope. Our model
 predicts that the crucial actors during the
 early stages of a movement are distinguished
 from others by their positions in a network
 of tied actors, not by their resource base. The
 wealthy join movements opportunistically,
 long after the diffusion process that drives
 increased interest in a movement has oc-
 curred. Evidence from numerous case stud-
 ies of social movements, such as Jenkins and
 Perrow's (1977) study of the United Farm
 Workers, suggests that this pattern is also
 likely to be observed empirically.
 Our model also suggests that network den-
 sity plays a crucial role in shaping movement
 outcomes, thus providing theoretical support
 for the large empirical literature that docu-
 ments a positive relationship between inter-
 personal ties and activism. Despite this ro-
 bust finding, little is known about how net-
 works facilitate activism and what dimen-
 sions of networks are responsible for the suc-
 cess of a movement (Gould 1993; McAdam
 and Paulsen 1993). Reviewing the relevant
 literature, Friedman and McAdam (1992)
 note:
 [N]etwork theory fails to offer a plausible
 model of individual action and therefore a con-
 vincing mechanism by which interpersonal
 contacts and organizational memberships draw
 individuals into activism. (P. 160)
 Beyond this, little is known about what kinds
 of network structures facilitate collective ac-
 tion. The dynamic social network model we
 develop provides potential solutions to these
 problems. Interpersonal ties are seen as the
 conduit not simply for information exchange
 or organization, but for interpersonal influ-
 ence, which operates on interests as actors
 seek balance across their relations with oth-
 ers. Through networks constituted by ties of
 interpersonal influence, local activism and
 interest can be widely diffused, creating a
 cascade of activism. The search for balance
 creates an interlocking network of activists
 that provides an ideological envelope that
 enables the production and reproduction of
 activism in the core while protecting activ-
 ists from cross-pressures.
 Increasing network density fosters the
 emergence of critical mass insulated within
 an activist core. Yet the effect of increased
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 network density is sharply felt only in a few
 structural contexts-the privileged regimes
 and the rebellious regimes. Across other col-
 lective action regimes however, increasing
 network density within plausible ranges fails
 to yield an insulated, densely interlocked ac-
 tivist clique. While interpersonal ties are im-
 portant, the structure of these ties and their
 distribution across interacting populations
 are fundamental.
 When collective action fails, actors are
 structurally unable to recognize and act on
 action sequences. Action sequences need not
 be successful to engender increased interest
 in a movement. Successful collective action
 in the privileged regimes and the rebellious
 regimes can follow early failures or partial
 successes, which play a critical role in in-
 creasing the average level of interest across
 the population of a challenging group. The
 recognition of others' participation creates
 the conditions for influence, which may trig-
 ger a cascade of activism and spread an ac-
 tivist culture. In impoverished regimes or es-
 tranged regimes, collective action sequences
 are likely to be unrecognized. When chal-
 lenges emerge in these regimes, analysts are
 certain to find, ex post, evidence of early and
 subtle forms of everyday resistance such as
 singing, foot-dragging, and working to rule,
 but the social structure necessary for actors
 to recognize and act on such resistance ap-
 pears, ex ante, is largely absent. In impover-
 ished regimes and estranged regimes, the
 problem of collective action lies in the pro-
 cess by which network ties, constructed on
 some basis other than resistance, emerge as
 salient relations through which political or
 ideational influence flows. There are models
 for such fundamental transformations of re-
 gimes in the historical record.
 Most interesting are instances of success-
 ful collective actions in highly repressive re-
 gimes whose power rests largely on the
 deconstruction of civil society. Clearly, in
 such regimes (e.g., Eastern Europe) repres-
 sion increases the costs of participation and
 lowers the probability of success. However,
 while authoritarian or totalitarian regimes
 deconstruct the formal secondary associa-
 tions (the traditional bases for group mobili-
 zation on the basis of interest), interpersonal
 friendship and kinship networks remain
 largely intact. These small-scale friendship
 networks can provide the structural bases for
 resistance that is insulated within the matrix
 of everyday activities. Although individuals
 can falsify their preferences in public (Kuran
 1995), the presence of loosely coupled op-
 position networks under the right circum-
 stances fosters the emergence of widespread
 opposition precisely because their private na-
 ture insulates them from cross-pressure. Re-
 pression may slow down a cascade of activ-
 ism by reducing organizational connectivity,
 but this can have the paradoxical effect of
 creating multiple sources of local opposition.
 The sudden catenation of loosely coupled
 islands of opposition can quickly yield a
 revolutionary situation when actors recog-
 nize their actions and others' actions as chal-
 lenging the existing regime. This appears to
 have occurred throughout Eastern Europe in
 1989, a situation vividly documented for
 East Germany by Pfaff (1996). Here and
 elsewhere, the key to the success of a move-
 ment rests on a unique combination of social
 structural building blocks and the flow of in-
 terpersonal influence.
 Hyojoung Kim is a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology
 at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 and Fellow of the Mellon/Center for Advanced
 Study in the Behavioral Sciences "Contentious
 Politics" Research Group. His current research
 focuses on the effects of social networks on vol-
 untary collective action and ideational diffusion.
 Peter S. Bearman is Associate Professor of Soci-
 ology at the University of North Carolina at
 Chapel Hill. His current work focuses on adoles-
 cent social structure and school context, the
 analysis of life histories of early members of the
 NSDAP, and ideational diffusion.
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